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Product-Market Strategy and Underwriting Performance in the 
United Kingdom’s (UK) Property-Casualty Insurance Market 
Abstract 
Drawing a framework from the organizational economics literature, we utilize a panel data 
design to examine empirically the effect of motor insurance and liability insurance business on 
the overall underwriting performance of insurers operating in the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
property-casualty insurance market. We find that participation in liability insurance contributes 
positively to underwriting performance, whereas motor insurance is associated with inferior 
underwriting performance. Additionally, we find that larger insurers have better underwriting 
performance and that reinsurance is associated with deteriorating underwriting performance. 
We conclude that our results could have potentially important commercial and/or policy 
implications. 
1. Introduction    
 Insurance markets are distinguishable from many other sectors of the economy in that 
levels of risk and informational uncertainty, complexity of products, modes of distribution, and 
intensity of competition vary widely across lines of business. This is particularly the case in 
property-casualty (non-life) insurance with its multiple risk specialities, intrinsic uncertainties, 
different levels of managerial discretion, and variable availability of actuarial data and risk-
based information systems (Adams and Jiang, 2016). Indeed, property-casualty insurance 
sector embraces a much wider range of insurance product-types than life insurance whose 
products tend to mainly cover mortality-type personal lines of insurance based on standardized 
actuarial tables. Additionally, in insurance markets, high monitoring and control costs can be 
incurred as a result of acute information asymmetries at the point-of-sale (i.e., adverse 
selection) and careless consumer behaviour ex-post (i.e., moral hazard). These imperfections 
have potentially important implications for product-market strategy, competition, and financial 
performance. Ma and Ren (2012) further note that insurers differ from non-financial firms in 
that they incur high operational expenditures up-front (e.g., advertising expenses and sales 
commissions) and after the point-of-sale (e.g., policy servicing and claims settlement costs). 
Also, tough regulatory requirements (e.g., with regard to capital maintenance) and the risk of 
policyholders switching insurance providers impose strategic constraints on the pricing of 
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insurance business (Harrington and Danzon, 1994). Moreover, as financial intermediaries, 
insurers (like banks) transform assumed risk liabilities into cash-generating assets, and 
therefore, they are more highly levered than general industrial firms (Mayers and Smith, 1981). 
Therefore, compared with their counterparts in other industrial sectors (e.g., manufacturing), 
insurance managers tend to have less strategic flexibility to lower prices to increase short-term 
product-market share. Together, these features make insurance markets potentially interesting 
domains for research. 
  Drawing a framework from the organizational economics literature, we utilize a panel 
data research design to examine whether underwriting performance differs between firms 
operating in the legal liability and motor vehicle insurance segments of the UK's property-
casualty insurance market. These two product-markets have distinctive characteristics. For 
example, motor insurance premiums are based on measurable factors (e.g., years driving 
experience, number and value of previous claims), and so motor insurance tends to be 
characterized by standardized policies (e.g., in terms of coverage and pricing formulae) and 
fairly predictable ('short-ail') risks (Li, Lin, Liu and Woodside, 2012)1. In addition, profit 
margins tend to be stable over time as a result of statutory compulsion, and so motor insurance 
could particularly suit insurers that wish (e.g., for stock price protection purposes) to control 
excessive volatility on their underwriting portfolios. However, at the same time, underwriting 
profits tend to be modest as a result of minimal barriers to entry, price/product competition, 
and constant returns to scale (Towers Watson, 2013). Under such business conditions, 
product/process innovations, which feed an insurance firm’s strategic competitive advantage, 
can be easily acquired and quickly replicated by rivals in the market. This often leads to firms 
                                                          
1 Motor insurance is a relatively more standardized product than other forms of asset insurance, such as 
property insurance. For example, the insurability and rates of premium for properties are dependent on 
a plethora of underwriting criteria such as function (e.g., commercial versus residential), scale (e.g., 
high-rise versus low-rise), design (e.g., conformity with different building regulations), and location 
(e.g., high versus low environmental risk). As a result, motor insurance is the archetypical standard 
insurance line compared with the largely bespoke nature of legal liability insurance.  
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operating in homogeneous lines of business, like motor insurance, becoming 'price takers' with 
high price elasticity of demand for their products (Datamonitor, 2014a). This situation can put 
additional downward pressure on profit margins and lower underwriting performance 
(Harrington and Danzon, 1994). In contrast, firms operating in legal liability lines of insurance 
are subject to relatively less statutory compulsion, reduced competition, and more 
unpredictable ('long-tail') risks that necessitate the use of highly specialized underwriting 
knowledge and advanced information systems (Winter, 1991, 1994). Yet, the application of 
intellectual capital and the propitious use of risk-based underwriting information can enable 
specialist legal liability insurers to realize above average-market rates of return (i.e., 'quasi-
economic rents'), especially during the 'hard' stages of the underwriting cycle2 . Such 
capabilities can allow strategic risk-taking firms, such as legal liability insurers, to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantages by focusing in niche product-market segments (Winter, 
1991, 1994). 
 Our study is motivated in at least three regards. First, we add to the management 
literature by highlighting theoretically and empirically the importance of information to 
insurers in strategic pricing and product positioning in different market segments, and 
ultimately, in realizing financial outcomes. Second, the panel-based fixed-effects identification 
strategy that we employ captures both time-series and cross-sectional dynamics between the 
two main product-markets that we examine and underwriting results. This procedure allows 
robust and reliable statistical inferences to be drawn from our analysis. Third, intra-industry 
research, such as the present study, can have some important advantages over inter-industry 
studies - for example, in avoiding potentially confounding effects arising from differences in 
                                                          
2 The underwriting cycle is the process by which the profit margins of property-casualty insurers 
fluctuate over time in response to periodical rises (e.g., as a result of unexpectedly severe losses) and 
falls (e.g., due to the inflow of market capital and consequential increase in market underwriting 
capacity) in product-market premiums (Cummins and Doherty, 2002). 
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industrial practices and regulation. At the same time, however, the results of single industry 
research, such as our insurance study, can be generalized to, and stimulate future investigations 
in, other sectors of the economy with similar structural market features and informational 
uncertainties, such as the banking, life insurance and pensions industries. 
 The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional 
background information on the UK’s property-casualty insurance market and justifies the UK 
as a domain within which to focus the study. Section 3 introduces our information economics 
framework and develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design 
employed, including a description of the data, description of the model, and definition of the 
variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, while section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Institutional Background 
 The UK is the largest insurance market in Europe and the third largest in the world after 
the US and Japan (Association of British Insurers, 2014).The motor vehicle and legal liability 
segments of the UK's property-casualty insurance market are different, with the former being 
relatively more open and price competitive than the latter3. For example, the Association of 
British Insurers (2014) reports that overall, the UK motor insurance sector has consistently 
incurred underwriting losses since the mid-1990s. In 2012/13, approximately 60 or so insurers 
actively operated in each of the motor vehicle and legal liability segments of the UK's property-
casualty insurance market. In 2012/13, gross annual premiums in the motor vehicle insurance 
line amounted to approximately £14 billion (i.e., about 28% of total annual gross property-
casualty insurance market premiums of just over £50 million) compared with roughly £5 billion 
(i.e., approximately 10% of total annual gross property-casualty insurance market premiums) 
                                                          
3 It is usual practice for motor vehicle insurance policies to include standard cover for public liability 
risks. However, the costs of such coverage are included in the standard premium and are dependent of 
the accident risk of the insured. The liability insurance component may be underwritten ith liability 
insurance underwriters operating under a partnership agreement with the primary motor vehicle insurer. 
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for the liability insurance sector, with the remainder accounted for by other lines such as 
property insurance (Association of British Insurers, 2014).  
 Legal liability insurance comprises statutory minimal levels of coverage (e.g., 
employers' public and product liabilities) as well as discretionary levels of lawsuit risk 
protection (e.g., professional indemnity insurance). In the UK, the legal liability segment of the 
insurance market is dominated by about ten or so insurance firms comprising both UK-owned 
operatives (e.g., Aviva plc and Hiscox plc) and UK licensed foreign insurers (e.g., Zurich and 
Allianz). The combined share of annual gross premiums generated by the top-10 insurers 
account for approximately 70% of the liability insurance segment of the UK property-casualty 
market (Datamonitor, 2014b). These liability insurers also transact a significant amount of 
international business (approximately £1.5 billion at the Lloyd's of London insurance market, 
most of which is written with US clients (Lloyd's of London, 2014). In contrast, the ten or so 
largest (mainly UK-owned) motor insurance carriers (e.g., Admiral plc and Royal Sun Alliance 
plc) in total account for roughly 45% or so of product-market share in terms of annual gross 
premiums (Towers Watson, 2013). 
 The property-casualty insurance market in the UK is a potentially interesting 
environment within which to conduct this research project in that unlike many other insurance 
markets the UK is, and has long been, a relatively open and less prescriptively regulated 
insurance market predicated on compliance with micro-prudential risk-based principles 
assessed by the insurance regulator at the level of the individual insurance firm. Therefore, 
compared with many other global insurance markets the UK's 'light touch' regulatory system 
has fostered greater product differentiation and price competition. We consider that these 
institutional attributes of the UK enable us to conduct more direct tests of our research 
hypotheses than might otherwise be the case in many other jurisdictions. 
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3. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Theoretical Perspective 
 Insurance is a complex risk management business in which underwriting knowledge 
and risk-based information systems are important corporate assets (Harrington and Niehaus, 
2003). In the organizational economics literature, transaction cost economics (Williamson, 
1985) explicitly recognizes risk and uncertainty as important strategic issues in market 
exchange. As a result, transaction-specific assets (e.g., business knowledge and information 
systems) have to be acquired and deployed by firms to facilitate efficient and effective 
economic trading, and realize financial goals. However, complete contracting and efficient 
trading are precluded by informational constraints (i.e., 'bounded rationality') and opportunistic 
self-seeking behaviour by transacting parties. These market failures are mirrored in another 
well-known genre of the organizational economics literature, namely agency theory. For 
example, Garven (1987) notes that risk management strategies, such as the purchase of 
insurance, mitigate the risks of financial distress and bankruptcy and binds managers to 
operating and investment strategies that maximize the traded value of the firm. The all-
pervasiveness of risk and uncertainty in insurance markets, coupled with the importance of 
risk-based information and managerial discretion in improving the underwriting performance 
of insurance firms therefore makes the organizational economics literature a potentially 
compelling framework within which to ground this study.  
Information and Pricing in Insurance Markets 
   Cummins and Danzon (1997) posit that in perfectly competitive markets, without 
information asymmetries and other frictions, insurance premiums will reflect the discounted 
present value of claims and expenses, and so premiums reflect expected future losses. 
Therefore, the long-tail loss structure of liability insurance is likely to result in higher insurance 
premiums. Fung, Lai, Patterson and Witt (1998) add that fluctuations in interest rates can create 
insurance pricing cycles that not only impact premiums, but also adversely affect investment 
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yields, thus influencing the ability of insurers to vary premiums to suit market conditions and/or 
realize strategic goals. Moreover, the discounted value of underwriting losses is dependent on 
the length of claims settlement tail. This means that the underwriting performance of short-tail 
motor insurance and long-tail liability insurance are likely to vary as a result of their distinctive 
claims payment schedules and inherent differences in their respective risk profiles and actuarial 
pricing.  
 Cummins and Danzon (1997) argues that incomplete information (adverse selection 
and moral hazard) in insurance markets can lead to systematic mispricing and differences in 
insurance coverage across lines of business. Such informational inefficiency can trigger 
managerial ‘herding’ behaviour (e.g., as insurance firms cut prices to preserve product-market 
share). This means that actual insured losses can deviate adversely from expectations unless 
the insurer uses information: (a) to structure and price insurance contracts on an 'actuarially 
fair' basis ex-ante (e.g., by using experience-related bonus-malus clause contracts); and/or (b) 
to control and monitor the x-post risk behaviour of policyholders (e.g., by applying loss 
adjustment procedures) (Jia, Adams and Buckle, 2011). Information asymmetries in insurance 
markets can also magnify the effects of underwriting cycles on market premiums (pricing) and 
increase the volatility of insurers’ underwriting results, which in extreme cases can lead to 
financial distress and insolvency (Cummins and Doherty, 2002). However, a key empirical 
question is whether such market conditions differentially affect underwriting performance 
across segments of the insurance market. 
Product-Market Strategy and Underwriting Performance 
 The predictability of future losses, and thus the pricing efficiency of risks underwritten 
by insurance firms, can vary between product-markets. For example, the greater predictability 
of motor vehicle accidents and the homogeneity of contractual forms tend to make motor 
vehicle insurance amenable to standard underwriting procedures and ‘actuarially fair’ pricing 
7 
 
(Li et al., 2012). In such a contracting setting, the level of managerial discretion needed in 
underwriting risks is reduced. In contrast, legal liability risk exposures are generally less 
predictable, and so they are more likely to be subject to bespoke policy terms and premium 
schedules. In this situation, the degree of managerial discretion over risk selection and pricing 
is likely to be relatively greater (Winter, 1991, 1994). Therefore, different segments of the 
property-casualty insurance market require distinctive levels of intellectual capital and risk-
based information to be applied in order to make the underwriting function successful. 
However, the costs associated with acquiring such human and technical 'specific-assets' can 
increase new entry costs in niche and highly specialized lines of financial services business 
such as liability and catastrophe insurance. High barriers of entry can often mean that the 
structure of such niche markets tends to be more concentrated with lower levels of product and 
price competition than in more standard lines of business like motor vehicle insurance. Under 
such market conditions, the managers of specialist legal liability insurers can use their 'asset-
specific' knowledge and informational advantages to realize above market-average profits (i.e., 
'quasi-economic rents') and secure competitive advantages over other insurance firms. The 
different technical specialities and risk knowledge needed in different lines of insurance 
business also means that insurers experiencing inferior underwriting performance in a 
particular product line, such as motor vehicle insurance, could be intrinsically constrained from 
moving to other potentially more profitable segments of the market. As a result: 
 Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, legal liability insurers will have better 
 underwriting performance than motor vehicle insurers. 
  Conversely, liability insurance is susceptible to unexpectedly severe losses (e.g., as a 
result of unforeseen legal judgements) as well as cyclical movements in market prices, 
disruptions in the supply of reinsurance, and volatile capital inflows/outflows. These macro-
market effects, as witnessed in the US liability insurance crisis of the mid-1980s, can negatively 
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impact the underwriting performance of liability insurers. This includes many UK-based 
insurers heavily exposed to international (particularly US) legal liability risks. Harrington and 
Danzon (1994) hypothesize that this can result in 'price wars' and declining profit margins for 
legal liability insurers. This implies that insurers operating in more predictable (safer) motor 
vehicle insurance are likely to command higher premiums (prices) than their counterparts 
writing less predictable insurance such as legal liability. 
 Prior research (e.g., Fung et al., 1998) suggests that in the motor vehicle insurance 
sector, the premium-effects of the insurance underwriting cycle tend to be less volatile in 
comparison with liability insurance (e.g., due to greater price and product competition). 
Moreover, in motor vehicle insurance the supply of reinsurance is generally less constrained 
and less risky (and hence cheaper) than in liability (long-tail) insurance lines (e.g., due to the 
availability of loss experience data). In addition, the standardization of products and business 
processes provides opportunities for motor insurers to realize economies of scale and benefit 
from a 'deep-pocket' strategy of 'high volume-low price' corporate growth (Li et al., 2012). In 
fact, since the early 1990s some new mono-line specialist entrants to the UK motor insurance 
segment of the market (such as Admiral plc that entered the motor segment of the UK insurance 
market in 1992/3) have achieved rapid growth and consistently healthy financial performance 
as a result of a strategy of customer segmentation, price discrimination, and product/process 
innovation. Winter (1994) further argues that the ease of filing legal liability claims for 
economic loss and suffering in cases of personal accident, and the high verification costs 
associated with such claims, incentivizes policyholders to engage in moral hazard behaviour - 
for example, by making false or over-stated claims under insurance policies. This implies: 
 Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, legal liability insurers will have worse 
 underwriting performance than motor vehicle insurers. 
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Control Variables 
 Firm-specific factors can influence the underwriting performance of firms operating in 
property-casualty insurance markets. As such, we control for five such factors in our analysis 
and briefly motivate their inclusion below. 
 Reinsurance: In insurance markets, the primary risk management technique for 
reducing (transferring) assumed risks, improving underwriting capacity, and securing key 
strategic finance goals, such as enhanced solvency and tax management, is reinsurance (Abdul 
Kader, Adams and Mouratidis, 2010). By mitigating risk and uncertainty, increasing risk-
bearing capacity, and creating other strategic benefits (e.g., reducing future taxes by stabilizing 
earnings), reinsurance is likely to improve underwriting performance. On the other hand, 
reinsurance can (e.g., due to restricted supply) be costly and/or engender excessive risk-taking 
leading to deterioration in underwriting performance (Froot, 2001). Thus, the effect of 
reinsurance on underwriting performance is ambiguous. 
 Firm size: Large firms can realize positive financial performance as a result of 
economies of scale, prominent product-market share, brand profile, and other firm-related 
attributes (Shim, 2011). As a result, we predict that, all else equal, large insurers are likely to 
have better underwriting performance than small insurers. 
 Investment earnings: Cummins and Grace (1994) point out that the period profitability 
of insurance firms is conditional on their investment earnings as well as underwriting 
performance. Investment earnings could also directly influence the underwriting practices of 
insurance managers. For example, managers could be motivated to reduce underwriting 
standards (lower profit margins) if the earnings on invested assets are, or expected to be, above 
the market average or some other strategic benchmark. As a result, all else equal, we expect 
that insurers with low investment earnings are likely to have higher underwriting performance 
than insurers with high investment earnings. 
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 Leverage: Cummins and Doherty (2002) note that the decision to underwrite a risk at a 
given rate of premium depends on the financial capacity (i.e., leverage or solvency) position of 
the insurance firm. Therefore, prospective investors and policyholders are likely to 'shy away' 
from highly levered insurers in order to avoid possible bankruptcy and protect the value of their 
future financial claims on the firm. This means that to attract new business highly levered 
insurers could lower prices and standards of risk assessment with adverse effects on 
underwriting performance. Consequently, we predict that, all else equal, lowly levered insurers 
are likely to have better underwriting performance than highly levered insurers. 
 Product mix: Phillips, Cummins and Allen (1998) contend that product diversification 
provides insurance firms with opportunities for income growth, risk reduction, and increased 
profitability through the realization of scale and scope economies in production, and other input 
factor synergies (e.g., in terms of the shared use of staff resources and technology). Therefore, 
all else equal, insurers with a more diversified product-mix are likely to have superior 
underwriting performance than insurers with a more specialized product range. 
4. Research Design 
Data 
 Longitudinal unbalanced panel data for 1985 to 2010 covering 329 UK-based insurers 
(4,059 firm/year observations) operating in the motor insurance and liability insurance sectors 
were obtained to test our hypotheses. In our panel data set, 219 (2,396 data points) out of 329 
insurance firms (4,059 data points) underwrite liability insurance, whereas 159 insurers (1,694 
data points) write motor insurance. In addition, 118 insurance firms (1,309 data points) are 
present in both the product-markets examined. Our data derive from the Standard & Poor’s 
SynThesys insurance companies’ database, which is sourced (since 1985) from annual filings 
submitted by UK insurance companies to the insurance industry regulator (which was the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) before April 2013). Also, the 26 years of time-series data 
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used are considered long enough to account for the effects of temporal changes in market 
conditions on our results. The final year covered by our panel data set - 2010 - represents the 
last period for which complete data were available at the time the study was carried out. The 
data collected relate to personal and commercial motor vehicle and liability insurance 
underwritten by independently operating and reporting non-life insurance companies licensed 
by the FSA to conduct property-liability insurance business in the UK. Very small non-life 
insurance providers and public sector insurance arrangements are excluded from the sample 
either because they do not directly and/or actively write much third party insurance business 
and/or complete data are not available. In addition, insurance firms in our panel data set had to 
record positive accounting values (e.g., for gross premiums written, incurred claims, and so on) 
or they were excluded from the sample selection process.  The vast majority of insurers in 
our data set (approximately 95%) are stock forms of organization of which roughly one-third 
are small mono-line insurers that specialize in one of either the motor or legal liability segments 
of the UK's insurance market. Furthermore, most stock insurers are private, but not main stock 
exchange listed, entities. The preponderance of stock over mutual forms of organization, and 
non-publicly quoted stock insurers in our data set precluded us from controlling for 
organizational form and public/private listing status despite the possibility that incentive and 
control differences arising in policyholder-owned and shareholder-owned corporate structures 
could affect the strategic finance decisions of insurers (Mayers and Smith, 1981). Underwriting 
syndicates operating at the Lloyd’s of London insurance market are also excluded due to the 
unavailability of public data, their unique (triennial) system of accounting that was in place 
during much of our period of analysis (up to calendar year-end 2004), and the different 
organizational structure of syndicates at Lloyd’s compared with conventional insurance firms 
(e.g., Lloyd’s syndicates are often owned and administered by managing agencies).  
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Model 
 We use a fixed-effects model as it controls not only for unobserved firm-specific time-
invariant heterogeneity (e.g., in terms of the quality of risk management expertise), but also for 
time-effects (Greene, 2003). The superiority of our choice of the fixed-effects over the random-
effects estimator was revealed by performing Hoechle's (2007) variant of the Hausman (1978) 
specification test - diagnostic that is robust to general forms of spatial and temporal 
dependence. However, this procedure may produce biased standard errors associated with 
parameter estimates as a result of heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Therefore, to 
counter this possibility, we follow Petersen (2009) and report results that are robust to both 
firm-level heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. The fixed-effects model also helps 
control for endogeneity issues such as omitted variable bias4. Therefore, we estimate the 
following fixed-effects model: 
UPERFit    = (LBTit, MOTit, CONTROLSit) + ηi  +  νt  + εit 
where UPERFit represents our dependent variable for insurance firm i in time t which is the 
annual combined ratio - a standard measure of underwriting performance in property-casualty 
insurance markets, and one that can be applied in assessing both aggregate and by-line 
underwriting performance. The combined ratio is defined as the ratio of annual incurred claims 
and loss adjustment costs to total net (of reinsurance) premiums earned plus annual operating 
expenses divided by total net (of reinsurance) premiums earned. A combined ratio of less than 
1 reflects underwriting profitability and a combined ratio greater than 1 indicates underwriting 
losses. 
 To focus analysis on the two product lines of interest, two variables enter the modelling 
procedure - LBTit is the ratio of annual net premiums written (NPW) in the liability business 
                                                          
4 A common way of dealing with endogeneity is to use instrumental variable (IV) analysis. However, 
determining suitable instruments that do not impact on the combined ratio but concomitantly predict 
the proportion of business written in each line of insurance was not possible in the current stdy.  
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to the annual NPW at the total business level, and MOTit is the ratio of the annual NPW in the 
motor business to the annual NPW at the total business level. The label CONTROLSit 
represents a vector of the five firm-specific control variables referred to above. The full set of 
the variables used in the fixed-effects model is defined in Table 1. Finally, the notations ηi and 
vt in the above equations are unobservable firm-specific (e.g., managerial ability) and time-
related (e.g., underwriting cycle) effects respectively, while εit is an error term.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
5. Empirical Analysis 
Summary Statistics    
 Summary statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 Table 2 indicates that the overall average combined ratio (UPERF) is 101% across all 
329 insurance firms in the unbalanced panel data set, suggesting that overall underwriting 
performance across firm/year cases is poor (i.e., more than 100%). The average combined ratio 
is larger than the median of 96%, suggesting that though most of the insurers manage to avoid 
underwriting losses, but there are a few which experienced severe losses during 1985 – 2010 
period. These summary statistics reflect a generally stable, albeit lacklustre, average 
underwriting performance for our sample of insurers over the period of analysis.  
 To examine the panel features of our dataset further, we also computed between-firm 
and within-firm descriptive statistics and report these in Table 2 alongside the overall 
descriptive statistics. The 'between' values measure cross-sectional firm-level differences in the 
variables of interest, while the 'within' values reflect temporal changes in the relevant firm-
level variables. In the case of UPERF, we observe that the between-firm and within-firm 
statistics contribute proportionately to the variance of overall-firm means with different 
14 
 
standard deviations, as ‘between’ and ‘within’ standard deviations for UPERF (respectively 
SD = 0.22 and SD = 0.30) accord closely with the overall mean of 0.35.  
 Descriptive statistics for our main explanatory variables, namely LBT and MOT, are 
also provided in Table 2. We use three alternative ways to select our sample based on these 
definitions. The first sample includes all insurers that write some business in any line of non-
life insurance. Under this approach, all 4,059 firm/year observations are included in the 
regression, but LBT takes value 0 for firm/years (1,663 data points) where no liability insurance 
premiums are underwritten. Similarly, MOT is set to zero for 170 insurance firms (2,365 data 
points) that do not underwrite motor insurance in a given year, but do undertake some other 
non-life insurance business. This way the estimation sample size is maximized, and it contains 
all insurance firms whether or not they write any liability/motor business. For clarity, we label 
these variables as LBT_Full and MOT_Full respectively and the corresponding sample as the 
'full sample'. The second approach includes all insurers that write at least one of liability and 
motor insurance business in a given year. There are 239 insurers with 2,762 observations in 
this sample. 219 out of these 239 insurers are liability insurers (2,396 data points) and 159 are 
motor insurance underwriters (1,694 data points). Thus, all the firm/year cases for which either 
motor or liability insurance was not written are excluded from the estimation sample. We label 
these variables LBT_OR and MOT_OR and the corresponding sample as the OR sample. 
Finally, the third sample includes 1,309 firm/year observations for 118 insurers, which write 
both liability and motor insurance, and the corresponding sample has been labelled as the AND
sample.  
We also conduct regressions with samples including either liability insurance or motor 
insurance as the key explanatory variable. Again, these regressions use three alternative 
samples, namely, FULL, OR and ALL. The FULL and OR samples are as previously defined, 
but the ALL sample follows a different definition. All insurance firm-years in which some 
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liability insurance was underwritten by a given insurer are included in LBT_ALL, but all other 
firm/year observations of LBT_ALL are set to missing values. Applying this selection method 
leaves 219 insurance firms with 2,396 data points in the panel sample; however, due to 
incomplete panel data nine of these insurance firms were dropped during the estimation. 
Similarly, all 1,694 firm/year observations corresponding to 159 insurance firms, which 
underwrote motor insurance, are included in MOT_ALL panel sample; yet again because of 
incomplete panel data nine of these insurers were dropped from the estimation. Thus, 
LBT_ALL and MOT_ALL provide information only about the firms that were active in 
liability insurance and motor insurance lines respectively for the duration of our dataset.  
 LBT_Full and MOT_Full have 4,059 observations each corresponding to 329 insurance 
firms, with 12 annual observations per insurance firm on average. Since this sample includes 
many insurers that are not present in one or both of these lines, the means of LBT_Full and 
MOT_Full are comparatively larger than their respective medians. The second sample 
including LBT_OR and MOT_OR has 2,770 observations corresponding to 247 insurance 
firms that were observed, on average, for 11 years. There were 219 firms writing liability 
insurance business leading to 2,396 observations over the full 26 years covered by our analysis, 
as shown by summary statistics for LBT_ALL. Liability insurance contributes on average 
about 18% to total annual NPW for a firm that writes liability insurance business; however, the 
median contribution of liability insurance to total annual NPW is only 9%. Similarly, there 
were 159 firms underwriting motor insurance resulting in 1,694 observations for MOT_ALL 
over 26 years. Motor insurance contributed on average about 37% to total annual NPW, 
whereas the median contribution of motor insurance to total annual NPW for a firm is about 
28%. For each of these variables, cross-sectional differences in annual NPW were the main 
source of variation for the overall sample; however, the intra-firm variation was relatively 
small. 
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 Table 2 shows that on average, insurers in our sample ceded 28% of gross annual 
premiums to reinsurance companies. However, analysis of 'between' and 'within' variation in 
the panel data set suggests that reinsurance varies more between insurers (between-firm SD = 
0.23) than for a given insurance firm over time (within-fi rm SD = 0.12). These descriptive 
statistics hint that while insurers differ in the amounts of reinsurance purchased by individual 
insurance firms, the level of reinsurance buying for individual insurers tends to be stable over 
time.  
 Table 2 also shows that the average log value of insurers' total assets in the panel data 
set is 11.3 (with an anti-log average value of total assets for insurers in our panel of £461 
million and SD of £1,321 million). Again, the logarithmically transformed values for firm size 
in our panel do not vary much across insurers (overall SD = 1.92 versus between-firm SD = 
1.73); on the other hand, individual insurance firms appear to get bigger over time (overall SD 
= 1.86 versus within-firm SD = 0.83). This reflects the declining number of active insurers over 
the 26 years from 1985 to 2010 (i.e., from 169 insurance firms in 1985/86 to 112 insurers in 
2010) as a result of market exits amongst smaller firms and increased average firm size due to 
merger and acquisitions. Mean value of 0.06 and standard deviations for investment earnings 
(between = 0.05; within = 0.04) suggest that there is substantial variation in investment 
earnings across insurance firms as well as temporally within insurance firms. On the other 
hand, leverage with a mean of 0.46 and overall standard deviation of 0.38 also shows similar 
amount of variation as investment income. The average value of 0.68 for product mix (PMIX) 
reported in Table 2 indicates that most insurers in our sample are not highly diversified. The 
standard deviation figures further suggest that cross-sectional variation in PMIX is higher than 
the within firm variation over period covered in this study (i.e., between-firm SD = 0.23 versus 
within-firm SD = 0.13) suggesting that levels of insurers' range of products do not substantially 
change over time.  
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Correlation Analysis  
 To further examine the pair-wise associations between the variables of interest we 
conduct a correlation analysis and report the relevant statistics in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 Table 3 reveals pair-wise correlation between UPERF and reinsurance ratio is 0.15 (at 
p≤0.01, 2-tail), i.e. increase in reinsurance is associated with deteriorating underwriting 
performance. This suggests that the ceding of reinsurance premiums can be costly to insurers, 
particularly in a ‘hard’ market. On the other hand, with correlation coefficient of -0.12 (at better 
than p≤0.01, 2-tail) leverage and UPERF move in opposite directions, that is, higher leverage 
is associated with better underwriting performance. Table 3 also reveals that association 
between LBT_ALL (for firms that are present in the liability insurance market) and UPERF is 
negative and statistically significant. MOT_ALL also has a negative and statistically significant 
correlation with UPERF. Similarly, UPERF has statistically significant correlation with INV 
and PMIX. Furthermore, we derive variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all of the independent 
variables that enter our regression analysis. All VIF are below 10, again indicating that bias 
due to multicollinearity is unlikely to be problematic when interpreting our empirical results 
(Kennedy, 2003). 
Multivariate Analysis 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 The results in Table 4 support our first hypothesis as liability insurance has a 
statistically significant negative effect on the combined ratio (an inverse measure of the 
underwriting performance) for FULL and OR sample results reported in Table 4. Thus 
participation in liability insurance is associated with statistically significant positive impact on 
the underwriting performance of an insurer. This suggests that as suggested in prior research 
(e.g., Winter, 1991, 1994), liability insurers use their special knowledge and experience to 
effectively price assumed liability risks and so realize underwriting profitability. The 
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coefficient estimate for LBT in our first (FULL) sample is -0.216 (p≤0.05 two tailed), which 
means that for a 1% increase in the proportion of liability insurance premiums, the combined 
ratio is expected to fall by nearly 22 basis points. A similar result is obtained for the OR sample 
as well, but not for the AND sample. As reported in Table 4, the AND sample is relatively 
small with only 118 insurance firms and 1,309 observations, which may be the reason for the 
LBT coefficient being insignificant for the AND sample. Additionally, we find that an 
increasing contribution of motor insurance business to total annual NPW at the firm-level is 
associated with inferior underwriting performance at better than the ten per cent level of 
statistical significance across all samples. The coefficient estimate for MOT in our first sample 
is 0.143 (p≤0.05 two tailed), which means that for a 1% increase in the proportion of motor 
insurance premiums, a 0.14% increase in the combined ratio is expected for an insurance firm. 
This suggest indicates that motor insurance risks are under-priced – for example, as a result of 
increased market competition as suggested by recent UK insurance market surveys (e.g., 
Datamonitor, 2014a)5 . The other two regressions yield coefficients estimates for MOT 
increasing in magnitude; thus the effect of participation in motor insurance line is consistent 
across differently defined samples. 
 Table 4 also reveals that, except for INV and PMIX, the firm-specific control variables 
that enter our regression analysis have either positively or negatively significant impacts on 
underwriting performance (at p≤0.10 or lower, 2-tail). Interestingly, the statistically significant 
and positive coefficient estimate for REINS in Table 4 implies that highly reinsured insurers 
tend to experience poor underwriting performance6. As noted earlier, this observation suggests 
                                                          
5 Heavy investment in specialist knowledge and expertise could restrict the ability of insurers to easily 
disengage from low margin motor insurance and enter new and potentially more profitable lines of 
insurance business. 
 
6 We further analyse this relation by replacing reinsurance ratio by its first difference, but the sign of 
the coefficient estimate is unchanged. This implies that an increase in the reinsurance rate is associated 
with deteriorating underwriting performance. 
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that ceding premium income to reinsurers can be costly to insurance firms, particularly during 
periods of economic downturn and/or in 'hard' markets of the underwriting cycle. The negative 
relation between reinsurance and underwriting performance could also reflect information 
asymmetries between primary insurers and their reinsurance partners and/or the possibility that 
insurers facing difficulties in effectively managing the profitability of their underwriting 
portfolio (e.g., due to the lack of loss experience data) tend to be more heavily reinsured (Froot, 
2001).  
 The results presented in Table 4 also suggests that larger insurers, and highly leveraged 
insurers are likely to experience better underwriting results as indicated by negative but 
statistically significant estimated coefficients for LNSIZE and LEV (at p≤0.01, 2-tail). 
Compared with small insurers, large insurance firms tend to have more experienced managers 
and staff, and better access to better actuarial technology enabling them to better select and 
price risks, and so report sound underwriting performance (Shim, 2011 2003). Inconsistent 
with what we expected, high leverage also results in better underwriting performance. This is 
because leverage increases with the growth of net premiums written, and if incurred claims and 
expenses fall as a proportion of premiums then the combined ratio decreases and reported 
underwriting performance improves. We further observe that product diversification (PMIX) 
does not have any statistically significant effect on the underwriting performance of insurers. 
This result is consistent with both the correlation analysis carried out earlier (see Table 3), and 
accords with the notion that product diversification reducs the volatility of risks underwritten 
by insurance firms (Phillips et al., 1998). Finally, contrary to expectations, the investment 
income ratio (INV) does not have any statistically significant direct effect on the underwriting 
performance of the UK insurers in our sample. 
20 
 
Robustness Tests 
 The correlation analysis presented in Table 3 indicates that a st tistically significant 
correlation exists between LBT and MOT (at p≤ 0.01, two tail). Therefore, to further establish 
the robustness of results presented in Table 4, we conducted regressions across the three 
samples with either LBT or MOT present in the model at a time. The results obtained from this 
analysis are presented in Tables 5 (LBT) and 6 (MOT).  
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
The coefficient estimates for all the variables of interest presented in both Tables 5 and 6 are 
consistent with those reported in Table 4, indicating that our results are robust to the use of 
alternative and segregated specifications for liability and motor insurance. Again, the results 
are qualitatively unchanged suggesting that our observations are not significantly affected by 
cyclical pricing effects in both the liability and motor segments of the UK's property-casualty 
insurance market. To ensure that our results are not driven by extreme values in either tail, we 
also conducted a fixed-effects panel quantile regression analysis centred at median values. The 
results (unreported) of the quantile estimation are in line with the fixed-effects regression 
results reported in Table 4.  
6. Conclusion 
 Drawing a framework from the organizational economics literature and utilizing a 
dynamic panel design on longitudinal data for 1985 to 2010 drawn from the UK's property-
casualty insurance industry, we examine whether legal liability or motor insurance improves 
underwriting results for insurers. Our research findings indicate that liability insurance has a 
statistically significant positive impact on the underwriting performance of non-life insurers. 
On the other hand, participation in motor insurance is associated with a high combined ratio, 
leading us to conclude that motor insurance has a negative impact on the underwriting 
performance of insurers. We further observe that reinsurance is associated wth poor 
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underwriting performance, and that firm size and increased leverage can positively impact on 
insurers' underwriting performance. However, investment returns and product diversification 
do not have statistically significant effect on underwriting performance. Our results are also 
robust to heteroskedasticity, serial autocorrelation, and multicollinearity.  
 The general 'take-away' from the present study is that it is difficult to create 
informational and strategic economic advantages from participating in relatively more 
predictable product-markets such as motor insurance; further, newer market entrants may find 
it difficult to survive and prosper alongside larger firms in increasingly concentrated insurance 
markets. We believe our study contributes to the extant literature in two main ways. First, in 
heavily regulated, highly competitive but standardized lines of business, such as motor 
insurance, sustained competitive advantages can only be realized from lower than market 
average costs of production and/or the optimization of future revenue streams. In this regard, 
our research could thus help insurance regulators to design licensing rules that restrict entry to 
'tight' segments of the market, like motor insurance, to insurers with the requisite business 
capabilities. Second, our analysis implies that specializing in selection and pricing of risky but 
profitable products may be economically beneficial for insurers. Indeed, our results show that 
specialist legal liability insurers realize quasi-'economic rents' from underwriting highly 
unpredictable and idiosyncratic litigation risks. Again, our results could lead to regulators being 
more embracing of new market entrants with 'growth opportunities' in particular risk specialties 
such as legal protection insurance. In addition, the negative impact of reinsurance on 
underwriting performance could highlight the cost implications of risk transfer and encourage 
insurance managers to focus on the ‘actuarially fair’ pricing of risks assumed rather than 
relying on reinsurers to share the burden of future mispriced losses. In addition, our research 
results could have strategic implications for other industrial sectors (e.g., banking) that operate 
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in lines of business (e.g., deposits versus derivatives trading) that have distinctly different 
levels of risk and uncertainty.  
 We acknowledge that our study has inherent limitations such as its focus on only two 
(albeit important and distinctive) lines of insurance business – motor and legal liability 
insurance. Our results could also be driven by unobserved profitability differences in the 
composition of underwriting portfolios of motor and liability insurers (e.g., commercial versus 
personal lines). However, despite such limitations we believe our research design has merits. 
For example, the longitudinal and cross-sectional nature of our data and the fixed-effects panel 
estimation used in our study effectively accounts for changes in the UK property-casualty 
insurance market and controls for possible econometric problems, such as inconsistent 
parameter estimates in the panel data. Finally, we consider that the results of our study could 
help stimulate further strategic insurance research that focuses on product-market strategy, 
product-market competition, and the performance of firms in different industrial settings in 
Europe and elsewhere. 
 
 
  
23 
 
References 
 
Abdul Kader, H., Adams, M. and Mouratidis, K. (2010), Testing for trade-offs in the 
reinsurance decision of UK life insurance firms, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 
25(3), pp. 491-522. 
 
Adams, M. and W. Jiang (2016), Do outside directors influence the financial performance of 
risk-trading firms? Evidence from the United Kingdom (UK) insurance industry, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 28 (3), pp.481-501. 
 
Association of British Insurers. (2014). UK Insurance Key Facts 2014. London: ABI. 
 
Cummins, J.D. and P. Danzon (1997), Price, financial quality and capital flows in insurance 
markets, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6 (1), pp. 3-38. 
 
Cummins, J.D. and Doherty, N.A. (2002), Capitalization of the property-liability insurance 
industry, Journal of Financial Services Research, 21(1-2), pp. 5-14. 
 
Cummins, J.D. and Grace, E. (1994), Tax management and investment strategies of property-
liability insurers, Journal of Banking and Finance, 18(1), pp. 43-72. 
 
Datamonitor (2014a), UK Commercial Motor Insurance Market Dynamics and Opportunities. 
London: Datamonitor.  
 
Datamonitor (2014b), UK Employers' Liability Insurance: Market Dynamics and 
Opportunities. London: Datamonitor. 
 
 
Froot, K. (2001), The market for catastrophe risk: A clinical examination, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 60 (2-3), pp. 529-571. 
 
Fung, H-G., G.C. Lai, G.A. Patterson, and R.C. Witt (1998), 'Underwriting cycles in property 
and liability insurance: An empirical analysis of industry and by-line data, Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, 65(4), pp. 539-562. 
 
Garven, J.R. (1987), On the application of finance theory to the insurance firm, Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 1(1), pp. 77-111. 
 
Greene, W.H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Harrington, S.E. and P. Danzon (1994), Price cutting in liability insurance markets, Journal of 
Business, 67 (4), pp. 511-538. 
 
Harrington, S.E. and G.R. Niehaus (2003), Risk Management and Insurance, New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
  
Hausman, J.A. (1978), Specification tests in Econometrics, E onometrica. 46(6), pp.1251-
1271. 
 
24 
 
Hoechle, D. (2007), Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional 
dependence, The Stata Journal. 7(3), pp. 281-312. 
 
Jia, J.Y., Adams, M. and Buckle, M. (2011), The strategic use of corporate insurance in China, 
European Journal of Finance, 17(8), pp. 675-694. 
 
Kennedy, P. (2003), A Guide to Econometrics, Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Li, C-S., C.H. Lin, C-C Liu and A.G. Woodside (2012), Dynamic pricing in regulated 
automobile insurance markets with heterogeneous insurers: Strategies nice versus nasty for 
customers', Journal of Business Research, 65(7), pp. 968-976. 
 
Lloyd's of London (2014). Lloyd's 2014 Annual Report. London: Lloyd's Insurance Market. 
 
Ma, Y-L and Ren, Y. (2012), Do publicly traded property-casualty insurers cater to the stock 
market? Journal of Risk and Insurance, 79(2), pp. 415-430. 
 
Mayers, D. and C.W. Smith (1981), Contractual provisions, organizational structure and 
conflict control in insurance markets, Journal of Business, 54(3), pp. 407-434. 
 
Petersen, M.A. (2009), Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches, Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480. 
 
Phillips, R.D., Cummins, J.D. and Allen, F. (1998), Financial pricing of insurance in the 
multiple-line insurance company, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 65(4), pp. 597-636. 
 
Shim, J. (2011), Mergers & Acquisitions, diversification, and performance in the U.S. property-
liability insurance industry, Journal of Financial Services Research, 39(3), pp. 119-144. 
 
Towers Watson (2013). A Choppy Voyage: 2013 UK Motor Insurance Industry Report. 
London: Towers Watson. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press: New York. 
 
Winter, R.A. (1991), The liability insurance market, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(3), 
pp. 115-136. 
 
Winter, R.A. (1994), The dynamics of competitive insurance markets, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 3(4), pp. 379-415. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table 1 - Definition of Variables 
This table presents the labels of the key variables used in the study together with their full 
descriptions. All variables are measured using accounting period year-end figures. 
Variable Representation Description Expected 
Sign 
Dependent 
Variable 
UPERFit Combined Ratio 
(Annual incurred claims (& loss 
adj. costs)  + annual operating 
expenses) ÷ total annual net   
premiums earned   
Main 
Explanatory 
Variables 
LBT it 
Proportion of 
liability insurance 
premiums 
Ratio of net annual premiums 
written in liability line to total 
net annual premiums written 
± 
MOTit 
Proportion of 
motor insurance 
premiums 
Ratio of net annual premiums 
written in motor line to total net 
annual premiums written 
± 
Control 
Variables 
LNSIZEit Firm size 
Natural log of (inflation-
adjusted) total assets 
- 
REINSit Reinsurance ratio 
(annual reinsurance premiums 
ceded) ÷ (annual gross premiums 
written) 
± 
LEV it Leverage 
(Net premiums written) ÷ (equity 
+ reserves) 
+ 
INV it 
Investment 
earnings 
(annual investment earnings) ÷ 
(total invested assets) 
+ 
PMIX it 
 
Product mix 
 

N
j
jS
1
2  
Where,                             
Sj: (annual premiums written in 
jth line) ÷ (total annual premiums 
written across main groups of 
insurance business) 
- 
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Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of all the variables used in this study as defined in Table 1.  
Variable   Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Observations 
UPERF 
overall 1.013 0.962 0.349 0.473 3.198 N =    4059 
between   0.222 0.529 1.936 n =     329 
within     0.301 0.003 3.057 T-bar = 12.34 
LBT_Full 
overall 0.105 0.009 0.205 0.000 1.000 N =    4059 
between   0.222 0.000 1.000 n =     329 
within     0.086 -0.378 0.857 T-bar = 12.34 
LBT_OR 
overall 0.153 0.061 0.232 0.000 1.000 N =    2770 
between   0.252 0.000 1.000 n =     247 
within     0.094 -0.329 0.892 T-bar = 11.22 
LBT_ALL 
overall 0.177 0.087 0.241 0.000 1.000 N =    2396 
between   0.258 0.000 1.000 n =     219 
within     0.099 -0.305 0.916 T-bar = 10.94 
MOT_Full 
overall 0.153 0.000 0.281 0.000 1.000 N =    4059 
between   0.263 0.000 1.000 n =     329 
within     0.093 -0.597 0.940 T-bar = 12.34 
MOT_OR 
overall 0.225 0.020 0.316 0.000 1.000 N =    2770 
between   0.294 0.000 1.000 n =     247 
within     0.105 -0.526 1.011 T-bar = 11.22 
MOT_ALL 
overall 0.367 0.283 0.333 0.000 1.000 N =    1694 
between   0.322 0.000 1.000 n =     159 
within     0.123 -0.383 1.042 T-bar = 10.65 
REINS 
overall 0.276 0.215 0.243 0.000 0.977 N =    4059 
between   0.225 0.000 0.910 n =     329 
within     0.124 -0.399 1.122 T-bar = 12.34 
LEV 
overall 0.463 0.383 0.391 0.000 2.853 N =    4059 
between   0.349 0.000 1.986 n =     329 
within     0.199 -1.063 2.650 T-bar = 12.34 
LNSIZE 
overall 11.258 11.170 1.959 5.697 16.649 N =    4059 
between   1.731 6.540 15.825 n =     329 
within     0.835 6.418 15.325 T-bar = 12.34 
INV 
overall 0.061 0.057 0.055 -0.605 0.976 N =    4059 
between   0.047 -0.210 0.553 n =     329 
within     0.044 -0.616 0.772 T-bar = 12.34 
PMIX 
overall 0.684 0.639 0.262 0.219 1.000 N =    4059 
between   0.234 0.236 1.000 n =     329 
within     0.130 0.195 1.256 T-bar = 12.34 
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Table 3 – Correlation Analysis 
This table reports correlation coefficients computed using Pearson Product Moment Correlation Analysis for all the key variables used in this study.  All 
variables are as defined in Table 1. Superscripts *; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (2-tail). 
  UPERF LBT_Full LBT_OR LBT_ALL MOT_Full MOT_OR MOT_ALL REINS LEV LNSIZE INV 
LBT_Full -0.01  1                   
LBT_OR -0.04***  1***  1                 
LBT_ALL -0.06***  1***  1***  1               
MOT_Full -0.02* -0.12*** -0.29*** -0.20***  1             
MOT_OR -0.06*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.20***  1***  1           
MOT_ALL -0.06*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.22***  1***  1***  1         
REINS  0.15***  0.14***  0.09***  0.03 -0.19*** -0.36*** -0.31***  1       
LEV -0.12*** -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.10***  0.06***  0.40***  0.38*** -0.39***  1     
LNSIZE -0.02  0.06*** -0.06*** -0.09***  0.20***  0.10*** -0.13*** -0.04*** -0.19***  1   
INV  0.09*** -0.02 -0.05*** -0.07***  0.01 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.02* -0.09***  1 
PMIX -0.04*** -0.15***  0.05***  0.19*** -0.07***  0.19***  0.55*** -0.18***  0.19*** -0.43*** -0.07*** 
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Table 4 - UK Property-Casualty Insurers, 1985-2010: Fixed-Effects 
Estimation 
This table presents the results of the fixed effects regression estimation that tes s the differences in 
underwriting performance of insurers across 3 alternative samples. The FULL sample includes all P&C 
insurers, while the OR sample includes only the insurers participating either in the motor insurance or 
the liability insurance product-markets. The AND sample includes insurers participating in both the 
liability and the motor insurance lines in a given year. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard 
errors reported in this table are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. This table al o reports 
results from the modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity; the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data and modified Hausman specification test of Hoechle (2007). Statistical 
significance levels are *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, and * = 0.10, and they are reported at the 2-tail level. 
Variables 
Full OR AND 
Coefficien
t 
Rob Std 
Err 
Coefficien
t 
Rob Std 
Err 
Coefficien
t 
Rob Std 
Err 
LBT 
-0.216** 0.085 -0.266*** 0.101 0.031 0.136 
(-2.53)   (-2.63)   (0.23)  
MOT 
0.143* 0.076 0.242*** 0.086 0.302** 0.123 
(1.88)   (2.82)   (2.46)  
REINS 
0.449*** 0.057 0.493*** 0.078 0.453*** 0.139 
(7.89)   (6.35)   (3.27)  
LEV 
-0.048 0.033 -0.425*** 0.065 -0.541*** 0.108 
(-1.44)   (-6.55)   (-5.01)  
SIZE 
-0.080*** 0.013 -0.112*** 0.019 -0.075** 0.035 
(-6.02)   (-5.98)   (-2.14)  
INV 
0.207 0.153 0.231 0.214 0.62 0.405 
(1.35)   (1.08)   (1.53)  
PMIX 
-0.08 0.049 0.035 0.066 0.028 0.106 
(-1.61)   (0.53)   (0.26)  
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.103 0.176 0.238 
No. of obs 4059 2762 1309 
No of Firms 329 239 118 
Obs per firm:       
min 2 2 2 
avg 12.3 11.6 11.1 
max 26 26 26 
Diagnostics 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
χ2(329) 2.00E+34 p-value 0   
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
F(1, 311) 3.25E+06 p-value 0   
Modified Hausman test  
F(7, 25) 6.59 p-value 0     
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Table 5 - UK Property-Casualty Insurers, 1985-2010: Robustness Tests 
(Liability Insurance) 
This table presents the results of the fixed effects regression estimation that tes s the differences in 
underwriting performance of insurers across 3 alternative samples. The FULL sample includes all P&C 
insurers, while the OR sample includes only the insurers participating either in the motor insurance or 
the liability insurance product-markets. The ALL sample includes only the insurers participating in the 
liability insurance business in a given year. All variables are as defined in Table 1. LBT, the ratio of net 
liability insurance premiums written to total net annual premiums written is the main explanatory 
variable in this regression. Standard errors reported in this table are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Statistical significance levels are *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, and * = 0.10, and they are 
reported at the 2-tail level. 
Variables 
Full OR ALL 
Coefficient Rob Std Err Coefficient Rob Std Err Coefficient Rob Std Err 
LBT 
-0.243*** 0.084 -0.320*** 0.099 -0.290*** 0.106 
(-2.9)   (-3.24)   (-2.75)  
REINS 
0.437*** 0.056 0.472*** 0.076 0.509*** 0.088 
(7.84)   (6.2)   (5.82)  
LEV 
-0.042 0.033 -0.387*** 0.064 -0.554*** 0.081 
(-1.27)   (-6.07)   (-6.86)  
SIZE 
-0.076*** 0.013 -0.107*** 0.019 -0.108*** 0.022 
(-5.87)   (-5.71)   (-4.83)  
INV 
0.207 0.153 0.228 0.214 0.401* 0.238 
(1.35)   (1.06)   (1.68)  
PMIX 
-0.074 0.049 0.063 0.065 0.042 0.072 
(-1.5)   (0.97)   (0.59)  
R-squared 0.101 0.170 0.192 
No. of obs 4059 2752 2387 
No of Firms 329 239 210 
Obs per firm:        
min 2 2 2 
avg 12.3 11.6 11.4 
max 26 26 26 
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Table 6 - UK Property-Casualty Insurers, 1985-2010: Robustness Tests 
(Motor Insurance) 
This table presents the results of the fixed effects regression estimation that tes s the differences in 
underwriting performance of insurers across 3 alternative samples. The FULL sample includes all P&C 
insurers, while the OR sample includes only the insurers participating either in the motor insurance or 
the liability insurance product-markets. The ALL sample includes only the insurers participating in the 
motor insurance business in a given year. All variables are as defined in Table 1. MOT, the ratio of net 
motor insurance premiums written to total net annual premiums written is he main explanatory variable 
in this regression. Standard errors reported in this table are robust to heterosk dasticity and 
autocorrelation. Statistical significance levels are *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, and * = 0.10, and they are 
reported at the 2-tail level. 
Variables 
Full OR ALL 
Coefficient Rob Std Err Coefficient Rob Std Err Coefficient Rob Std Err 
MOT 
0.176** 0.074 0.289*** 0.083 0.200** 0.095 
(2.37)   (3.48)   (2.11)  
REINS 
0.453*** 0.057 0.499*** 0.076 0.385*** 0.103 
(8.01)   (6.53)   (3.74)  
LEV 
-0.052 0.033 -0.436*** 0.066 -0.286*** 0.075 
(-1.56)   (-6.64)   (-3.83)  
SIZE 
-0.083*** 0.013 -0.115*** 0.019 -0.084*** 0.022 
(-6.32)   (-6.13)   (-3.75)  
INV 
0.209 0.156 0.237 0.217 0.206 0.307 
(1.34)   (1.09)   (0.67)  
PMIX 
-0.066 0.050 0.038 0.066 0.029 0.085 
(-1.33)   (0.58)   (0.34)  
R-squared 0.100 0.170 0.186 
No. of obs 4059 2762 1682 
No of Firms 329 239 147 
Obs per 
firm:        
min 2 2 2 
avg 12.3 11.6 11.4 
max 26 26 26 
 
 
